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included in the provision relating to incompetents and as the
General Assembly had elsewhere declared that minor employees
shall be considered the same as adult employees, the exclusion of
minors from the saving clause was intentional.
Legislative cognizance of the rise in both wages and living
cost is evidenced by changes in both the Workmen's Compensation
Act, 0 and the Occupational Diseases Act 71 through which increases
in the amounts to be awarded for occupational injuries are
granted.
II.

CONTRACTS

The field of general contract law was barren of significant
decisions, as is usually the case, but some cases dealing with rather
specialized branches of that subject are worthy of notice.
INSURANCE

It is a well-settled rule that ambiguities in an insurance contract will be read in favor of the insured.' This rule was expanded
to the breaking point in Hooker v. New York Life Insurance Company2 wherein the court held that the beneficiary of an insured
was entitled to double indemnity benefits though the facts of the
insured's death seemed clearly to bring it within an exception
clause. The deceased met his death through accident while a
participant in maneuvers in New Zealand with the United States
Marine Corps Reserve during time of war. The defendant admitted no liability under the double indemnity provision of the
life policy, contending that the cause of death was within the
policy exception which read: ". . . provided, however, that such
double indemnity benefit shall not be payable if the insured's
death resulted, directly or indirectly, from . . . war or any act
incident thereto." Plaintiff contended the clause, by its very
wording, applied only when the insured met his death in actual
70 Laws 1947, pp. 962-75, H. B. 979; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, §§ 144-5.
71 Laws 1947, pp. 908-28, H. B. 980; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, §§ 172.7-8.
1 Jabara v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 280 Il. App. 147 (1935).
2 66 F. Supp. 313 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 171, 12 Mo.

L. Rev. 212 and 25 Tex. L. Rev. 313.
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combat. Exceptions clauses of this nature roughly divide themselves into two classes, i.e. the status clause and the result clause.
Where the former type has been used, the status of the insured at
date of death as a member of the armed forces in time of war
has generally been enough to relieve the insurer from liability as
to the double indemnity provision.3 Where the latter type is found,
the problem becomes one of interpretation and the majority of
courts have not hesitated to hold for the beneficiary unless the
facts relating to the insured's death clearly fall within the exception. 4 The decision above noted was reversed by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit when a majority of the
judges thereof held that recovery on the policy was against the
clear intent of plain excluding language. 5 The case of Eggena v.
New York Life Insurance Company0 was heavily relied on for the
policy exception involved therein was identical and the facts were
7
almost on all fours with the instant case.
Two cases of interest involved the permissive user clause
found in automobile liability insurance policies. 8 In Zitnik v.
Burik,9 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the permitted user
of the insured car has the same duty to co-operate with the insurer
as has the policy holder, so that a breach of this duty is ground
for denial of the protection given by the policy. The case of
Scott v. Inter-InsuranceExchange' ° was there distinguished. The
plaintiff had argued that the duty of the user to co-operate was
dependent on knowledge that the policy in question afforded pro3 Miller v. Ill. Bankers Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R. 378
(1919).
4 Boatwright v. American Life Ins. Co.. 191 Iowa 253, 180 N. W. 321, 11 A. L. R.
1085 (1920); Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152,
4 A. L. R. 845 (1919).
5 161 F. (2d) 852 (1947). Minton, C. J.,wrote a dissenting opinion.
6236 Iowa 262, 18 N. W. (2d) 530 (1945).
7 A dissent by Minton, C. J., was based on the idea that the exception clause
was insufficiently worded to exclude liability. lie pointed out that the insured met
his death as an incident to training for war and it would have been simple enough
for the defendant to have added to the limiting clause the words "or an act incident to training for war."
s This clause has also been referred to as the "omnibus" clause.

9 395 Il. 182, 69 N. E. (2d) 888 (1946), affirming 327 Ill. App. 170, 63 N. E. (2d)
635 (1945).
10352 Ill. 572, 186 N. E. 176 (1933).
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tection for him. The court indicated that such might be the rule,
but said no benefit could be drawn therefrom since the evidence
failed to show that knowledge was lacking." The insurer had
made several attempts to gain the details of the accident from the
permitted user but in each instance was rebuffed, so the court was
satisfied that there had been an absence of the co-operation required by the policy provisions.
In the case of Pallasch v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company,' 2 an administrator brought garnishment against an
insurer for collection of a judgment held against one Pallasch, an
alleged permitted user, for the wrongful death of her intestate.
The accident causing death occurred as Pallasch was returning
the car of the named insured to a service station, of which he was
the manager, after having spent some time repairing it after
hours in a private garage with the aid of another employee of
said station, the work being done without the consent or knowledge
of Pallasch's employer. The insurer contended that Pallasch did
not come within the permission clause because of an exception
thereto.3 - The evidence showed that Pallasch had the car owner's
permission to drive the car for repair purposes and the court,
reversing a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, held that under the facts stated and giving full weight to the
exclusion clause, Pallasch was a permitted user within the meaning of the policy.
Another case worthy of mention, in which the subrogation
rights of the insurer were involved, is Inter-Insurance Exchange
of Chicago Motor Club v. Anderson14 wherein it was held that if
an insured, after payment by the insurer for damages done to his
11 It would appear that there is no duty on the part of the insurer to inform
the user of the policy protection, for the court said: "Whether defendant was
required to give . . . notice of the protection afforded him . . . before there was
any duty resting upon him to cooperate is beside the question, for the requirement
of cooperation from the insured was not conditioned on such action." See 395 Ill.
182 at 188, 69 N. E. (2d) 888 at 890.
12 329 Ill. App. 257, 67 N. E. (2d) 883 (1946).
13That limitation purported to exclude from coverage "any person or organization or to any agent or employee thereof operating an automobile repair shop,
public garage, sales agency, service station, or public parking place, with respect
to any accident arising out of operation thereof."
14 331 Ill. App. 250, 73 N. H. (2d) 12 (1947).
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property, gives a general release to the tort-feasor, the insurer
may recover from the insured the full amount paid on the ground
of a breach of the subrogation contract but will not be permitted
to recover at the same time from the tort-feasor. The insured
argued for the rule accepted by the court in Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad Company v. Emmons 15 which had held that if,
after payment by the insurance carrier for the loss, the insured
has given, without consent or knowledge of the insurer, a release
to the tort-feasor who possesses knowledge of such payment, that
release is no bar to a suit by the subrogee carrier against the tortfeasor. Although the court admitted that authority existed for
such rule, 16 it preferred to follow the view expressed in the Pennsylvania case of Illinois Automobile Insurance Exchange v.
Braun" to the effect that the insured must reimburse the carrier
where, by giving a valid release, he has "put it beyond the power
of the insurer to obtain anything from the causer of the loss." 1 8
As was remarked by the court in the instant case, "...
the purpose
of the courts has been to protect the subrogation rights of the
insurer, whether the insurer chose to sue the wrongdoer as subrogee or to sue the insured for breach of policy, or both."1 9 However, as between co-defendants of this type in a joint suit, the
insured must suffer for it is he "rather than a stranger to the
insurance contract [who] must be conscious of the duties arising
20
out of his relationship with the insurer."
A case of first impression is that of Trust Company of Chicago v. New York Life Insurance Company.2 The issue involved
was the right of a conservator, appointed following adjudication
of the insanity of the insured, to payments claimed due under a
total disability clause in a life insurance policy. The wife of the
insured, beneficiary under the policy, was also made a party de15 42 Ill. App. 138 (1890). This case appears to be the only prior Illinois case in
(point.
1 City of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176. 152 P. (2d) 836, 157 A. L. R.
1233 (1944) ; Hart v. Western R. Corporation, 54 Mass. 99, 46 Am. Dec. 719 (1847).
17 280 Pa. St. 550, 124 A. 691, 36 A. L. R. 1262 (1924).
18 280 Pa. St. 550 at 555, 124 A. 691 at 692.
19 331 Ill.
App. 250 at 255, 73 N. E. (2d) 12 at 15.
20331 Ill.App. 250 at 258, 73 N. E. (2d) 12 at 16.
21331 Ill.
App. 468, 73 N. E. (2d) 789 (1947).
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fendant to the action. The conservator sued for payments which
the insured had refused to make on the ground that the one-time
disability had ceased and also because the policy had lapsed for
non-payment of premiums. The court below gave judgment to
the conservator and failed to recognize the claim of the beneficiary
for that part of the disability benefits which accrued after the
adjudication of insanity. 22 The insurer appealed, claiming error
in the refusal to give an instruction which directed that the jury,
should it find the disability payments were due, were to return a
verdict for the plaintiff only for the amount of the installments
due up to the date on which the insured was found insane and for
the beneficiary for installments accruing thereafter. When reversing that decision, the Appellate Court refused to give heed to the
conservator's contention that the only one prejudiced by the
alleged error was the beneficiary who had not appealed but instead
held the requested instruction to be proper. The disability provisions of the policy were found to be susceptible of no other
reasonable construction except that the insurer, on insanity of the
insured, must make the disability payments to the beneficiary.
Being bound to pay the beneficiary by the terms of the contract,
23
the insurer could not be compelled to pay the conservator.
A host of bills of importance in the field of insurance law
were before the recent General Assembly and a number of them
became enacted into law. 24 Particularly worthy of reference are
26
the measures adopted 25 in compliance with the McCarran Act
-2 The beneficiary had based her claim on a clause which read as follows: ". . . if

disability results from insanity, income payments under this section will be paid
to the beneficiary in lieu of the insured."
23 In reaching its decision, the court accepted the views previously voiced in
Bach v. Nagle, 294 N. Y. 151, 61 N. E. (2d) 421, 159 A. L. R. 1199 (1945), and in
Foulds v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 930, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 680 (1939).

24 See also Wanless, "Legislation Affecting Practice," 36 Ill. B. J. 102.
25 Laws 1947, p. 1098, H. B. 410; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, §§ 1065.1 to 1065.18,
and Laws 1947, p. 1111, H. B. 411; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, §§ 1065.19 to 1065.35,

inclusive. Laws 1947, p. 1110, H. B. 413; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 1091, and
repealing § 1087, was adopted to conform with H. B. 410 above mentioned. Since
all rates, including those relating to compensation insurance, now fall within the
area encompassed by the Department of Insurance, change was made necessary in
the sections last referred to relating to providing insurance for employers who had
been rejected by insurers for coverage under Workmen's Compensation and related statutes.
26 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1011-5.
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and the holding in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association.27 By these acts, certain new sections were added to
the Insurance Code, and some former provisions were repealed,
the whole being designed to permit of co-operative company action
in rate-making and related matters, looking toward the establishment of uniform rates, rating systems, plans and practices. Rate
schedules and the like are to be filed with the Director of Insurance who has the duty of disapproving any which are found to be
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory. Sections 125
and 128 of the Code were amended by changing the limitation on
the percentage of admitted assets available for investment in
designated types of securities, the most important change being
the increase from 50% to 60% now allowed for investment in the
securities of solvent private corporations. 28 Group accident and
health insurance may now be written on employees of members
of a bona-fide association having a purpose apart from that of
obtaining insurance2 9 and the size of the group required has been
halvedA0 A procedure has been set up for the conversion of fraternal benefit societies into mutual legal reserve life insurance
companies, a matter not previously authorized by statuteA1 The
Director of Insurance may refuse a license for an agent or broker
on the ground that the applicant has shared, without full knowledge of the policy-holder, in an adjustment fee paid by the policyholder for the processing of a claimA 2 The act providing for the
organization of property life insurance companies has been repealed, removing useless luggage as no companies have been
created under itA 3 Non-profit hospital service corporations and
medical service plans have now been placed solely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Insurance and it has been provided that no such group may issue policies to subscribers in any
27 322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
28 Laws
Ch. 73, §§
29 Laws
30 Laws
81 Laws
32 Laws
23 Laws

1947, p. 1137, S. B. 585, and p. 1143, H. B. 412; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
737 and 740.
1947, p. 1125, S. B. 537; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 979.
1947, p. 1127, S. B. 557; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 842.
1947, p. 1123, S. B. 597; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 911.1.
1947, p. 1094, H. B. 794; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 599.
1947, p. 1152, H. B. 590; Iln. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, §§ 1066-80 inclusive.
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given county unless it has contracts with hospitals located therein
operating a minimum of 30% of the beds there available.3 4 Other
minor changes have also been made relating to fraternal benefit
societies 5
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

Only one case worthy of mention falling within this field arose
during the past year and that was the case of Smith v. Reisch3 6 in
which plaintiff sought to hold personally liable certain parties
who had signed judgment notes as trustees trading as the Annie
Reisch Investment Company, a common law trust of Sangamon
County, Illinois. The court ruled that, under Section 20 of the
Negotiable Instrument Law, 37 these notes were not the personal
obligations of the signers even though there was no express authorization in the trust instrument for the making of judgment
notes. By way of dictum, because of the statutory issue, reference
was made to Newby v. Kingman38 as authority for the holding
that a trust could be held liable at law for its authorized contracts.
The Negotiable Instruments Law served to insulate the defendants from personal liability because of the statutory language
with respect to signing "in a representative capacity."
SALES

Very few cases relating to sales were of special significance
or involved new points of law. In Patargiasv. Coca-ColaBottling
Company of Chicago,39 however, the facts disclosed a case involving the presence of a deleterious substance, i.e. a dead mouse, in
a bottle of soft drink purchased and partly consumed by plaintiff
34 Laws 1947, p. 679, H. B. 791; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, §§ 553-5, 562, and
562a-562d, inclusive.
85 See Laws 1947, p. 1124, H. B. 717, and p. 1130, H. B. 499; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 73, §§ 904, 939 and 945.
36 329 Ill. App. 45, 67 N. E. (2d) 304 (1946). Leave to appeal has been denied.
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 98, § 40, states: "Where the instrument contains, or a
person adds to his signature, words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a
principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if
he was duly authorized.. .. "
as309 Ill. App. 36, 32 N. E. (2d) 647 (1941).
39 332 IR. App. 117, 74 N. E. (2d) 162 (1947).
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to her physical injury and in which the Appellate Court affirmed
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. One of the grounds upon
which plaintiff predicated her right to recover was that the
defendant had breached an implied warranty that its product was
fit for human consumption. The defendant, on the other hand,
contended that there could have been no implied warranty as to
the wholesomeness of its product available to plaintiff because of
an absence of privity of contract. The plaintiff countered with
the argument that an implied warranty to ultimate purchasers was
imposed on manufacturers of food or beverages sold in sealed
containers.
The Appellate Court acknowledged that the highest court of
this state had not passed upon such a question but it did refer to
two supreme court decisions elsewhere dealing therewith. In one
of them, an Iowa case, 40 the court made a distinction between food
products which were canned, bottled or wrapped in such a way
that neither the nature of the contents nor the condition thereof
might be known to the purchaser until opened for use and products which were packed in an observable condition. In the case
of the former, it was said to be the duty of the manufacturer to
see to it that food products put out by him were wholesome, and
that an implied warranty as to fitness ran with the sale for the
benefit of the consumer, rather than just to the wholesaler or
retailer. Privity of contract was there held not to be controlling.
The other case, from Texas,41 was predicated upon an even
broader basis for it declared that one who possesses a product,
gives it the appearance of being suitable for human consumption,
and places it in the channels of commerce, must expect some one
to consume the same in reliance on its appearance and cannot
avoid liability if harm follows. The Appellate Court saw fit to
adopt the ideas expressed in those two cases, declared that where
an article of food or drink is sold in a sealed container for human
consumption public policy demands that an implied warranty that
the article is wholesome and fit for use be imposed upon the manu40 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920).
41 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S. W. (2d) 828 (1942).
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facturer, and said that such warranty runs with the sale for the
benefit of the consumer.
One of the issues in Hart v. Evans4 2 was a question of compliance with the Illinois Bulk Sales Act 4 3 and raised the query
whether a written statement, made under oath by the president
of a corporation selling, in bulk, the major part of its goods and
chattels, which stated that "upon information and belief" the list
submitted contained the names of all the creditors was sufficient
to satisfy statutory requirements. The court answered the question in the negative, considering such a statement fatally defective in view of the express provision that the sworn statement
should be made by one "having knowledge of the facts."
Modification of the Bulk Sales Act has occurred in that now
the vendee must receive from the vendor a list of creditors at
least ten days, formerly five, before the consummation of the
sale, and the vendee must at least ten, formerly five, days before
taking possession of the goods notify the seller's creditors of the
sale. He may pay to the vendor so much of the purchase price
as shall be in excess of the total amount of the indebtedness of
the vendor before the expiration of the ten-day period above mentioned. 44 Some minor changes have also been made in the provisions of the statute relating to the sale of securities4 5 and to the
46
sale of livestock.
QUASI-CONTRACTS

Undue retention of money rightfully due to a plaintiff may
lead to the imposition of an obligation to pay interest on the sum
retained, even though there be no promise to that effect, 47 for
such an obligation may well be imposed by statute. 48 Where such
a quasi-contractual liability is sought to be enforced, however,
42 330 Il.

App. 385, 71 N. E. (2d)

43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211,

546 (1947).

§§ 78-9.

44 Laws 1947, pp. 1516-7, S. B. 571; Ini. Rev. Stat. 1947, Oh. 121Y2, § 78.

45 Laws 1947, pp. 1518-23, H. B. 856; I1.
46 Laws 1947, pp. 1517-8, S. B. 108; I1.

Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1213,
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121

§ 96 et seq.

, § 215.

47 See Wittemore v. People, 227 Ill. 453, 81 N. E. 427, 10 Ann. Cas. 44 (1907).

4s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 74, § 2.
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it is generally granted only if the debtor has been guilty of that
unreasonable or vexatious delay referred to in the statute for
there was no common-law duty to pay interest. 49 It was for that
reason, therefore, that the Illinois Supreme Court in part reversed
the holding in Woodruff v. City of Chicago,50 a suit brought to
recover payments made under a special assessment proceeding
for a street widening which had been abandoned by the municipal
ity, because it was of the opinion that the city had done nothing
to impede the creditor in his efforts to recover the money so
paid other than to insist upon a judicial determination of its
liability 'in that respect. 5 1

III.

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

In the years since the adoption of the Civil Practice Act most
of the debatable problems concerning the conduct of litigation
under the reformed system of procedure have been ironed out
although questions do still arise. Cases which have dealt therewith are here summarized and arranged in much the same order
as these questions are likely to develop in the conduct of a given
case.
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDES

As the fruits of litigation can rise no higher than the source,
the practitioner's first concern should be with aspects of jurisdiction for if that is lacking all other efforts will prove wasted. No
questions have arisen as to the power of the major nisi prius
courts to entertain suits' and only one minor and indirect point
49 Totten v. Totten, 294 Ill. 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920).
50394 Ill. 542, 69 N. E. (2d) 287 (1946), in part reversing 326 Ill. App. 577, 63
N. E. (2d) 124 (1925).
5' In that regard, see Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 46 N. E. (2d) 41 (1943),
reversing 313 Ill. App. 407, 40 N. E. (2d) 565 (1942).
1But see the discussion dealing with the jurisdiction of city courts in divorce
matters elsewhere in this survey under the topic of Family Law. Attention might
also be called to legislative revision of the statute relating to courts for cities
and incorporated towns: Laws 1947, p. 766, S. B. 36, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 37,
§ 333 et seq.; to some increases in compensation for judicial officials: Laws 1947,
p. 773, S. B. 154, p. 776, S. B. 580, and p. 796, S. B. 187; as well as to some
changes in pension arrangements for judges: Laws 1947, p. 775, H. B. 136, and p.
774, H. B. 512.

